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Abstract.  Financial  market  events  in  2007  and  2008  pose  a 
fundamental challenge for traditional Financial Services industry risk 
assessment  approaches  such  as  Value  at  Risk  (VaR)  models  and 
capital  adequacy  risk  measures.  Unexampled  events  such  as  the 
liquidity  crunch  of  the  global  credit  markets,  and  its  impact  on 
individual Financial Services firms, clearly demonstrated the need to 
complement VaR risk models and traditional  risk metrics with other 
types of risk models and metrics. The goal of the present paper is to 
introduce  such  a  different  type  of risk  modelling  framework,  i.e., 
functional  risk modelling.  Key concepts  from resilience engineering 
are introduced and leveraged to define the approach. The primary goal 
of  the  proposed  modelling  framework  is  to  identify  functional 
dependencies  between a firm’s business functions  and the functions 
that drive key behaviours of the global financial markets. An example 
from  2007’s  financial  markets  is  used  to  illustrate  the  proposed 
framework,  i.e.,  the  rapid  demise  of  the  UK  based  residential 
mortgage firm Northern Rock.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the years 2007 and 2008, shockwaves propagated through the global Financial 
Services  industry.  These  shockwaves  were  triggered  by  an  unexampled  event 
(Westrum, 2006), i.e., the global credit market crunch and its impact on other parts 
of  the  global  Financial  Services  system.  For  example,  the  US  firm  Citigroup 
reported a 3rd quarter loss of 60% in 2007 due to the need to write-off more than 13 
billion  US dollars.  Many  other  reputable  global  Financial  Services  organizations 
exhibited a similar pattern, i.e., UBS (Switzerland), Bank of America (USA), Merrill 
Lynch (USA) and Deutsche Bank (Germany). In addition, some Financial Services 
firms suffered catastrophic business failures,  e.g., the US based global investment 
banking  firm  Bear  Stearns  Companies,  Lehman  Brothers  and  the  UK  based 
residential mortgage lending firm Northern Rock. 
The 2007 global credit market crunch was an unexampled event, i.e., something so 
unexpected  that  it  requires  extreme  imagination  to  think  of,  and  that  pushed 
organisations outside of their experience envelope. (Other categories of events are 
the regular threats that occur so often that it is cost effective for an organisation to 
develop a standard response, and irregular threats that are one-off events, for which 
it  is  not  cost  effective  to  prepare  a  standard  response  although  it  would  not  be 
impossible.) What happened in this case was the almost unimaginable scenario that 
an event originating from the US subprime markets propagated rapidly through the 
global Financial Services system with an unprecedented impact on practically every 
subsystem or component. One implication of the 2007-2008 market turmoil was the 
realisation  that  the  use  of  historical  data  to  predict  the  future  obviously  did  not 
provide the required forward looking assessment of financial market behaviour (e.g., 
Bernstein, 2007). However, many traditional risk metrics and forecasting techniques 
used in the Financial Services industry do rely on historical data including value at 
risk (VaR) approaches used to determine market risk (Manganelli & Engle, 2001). 
In reaction to the events in 2007 and 2008, commentaries from policy makers (e.g., 
April  2008  report  published  by  the  Financial  Stability  Forum1)  indicate  that 
regulatory  bodies  and  Financial  Services  experts  are  aware  of  the  limitations  of 
traditional  risk  metrics  and  of  the need to  augment  the Basel  II  accord,  the risk 
framework developed by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS, 2008). 
In this  paper,  we suggest  that  the field  of  resilience  engineering  can provide  the 
Financial Services industry with a different type of risk models, namely functional 
modelling approaches. The term ‘functional’ in the present work is used to denote 
the  fact  that  models  are  focused  on  capturing  behaviour  of  Financial  Services 
functions performed to achieve specific goals and objectives rather than attempting 
to describe how they are implemented by any specific entity or component of the 
global financial system at a certain time point (cf., Merton & Bodie, 1995).
The primary objectives of this paper include:
o Provide  a  summary  of  the  stress  experienced  by  the  global  Financial 
Services System in 2007-2008.
o Introduce key concepts from the emerging field of resilience engineering 
and to leverage these to illustrate basic concepts of a functional modelling 
framework.
o Exemplify  the  modelling  framework  using  the  demise  of  the  UK based 
residential mortgage firm Northern Rock. 
Throughout  the  paper,  the  term ‘risk’  will  be  used to  denote  a  state  in  which  a 
financial  system (or  an entity  of  a financial  system) is  exposed to uncertainty  of 
outcomes that could be either positive or negative. 
1)
 The Financial Stability forum was formed in 1999 with the goal “…to promote international 
financial stability, improve the functioning of markets, and reduce systemic risk” 
(http://www.fsforum.org). 
2 THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SYSTEM IN 2007-2008
The 2007-2008 financial  markets turmoil  has been the subject  of many so called 
Financial  Stability  reports  published  by  Central  Banks.2) Other  important  entities 
such as the Financial Stability Forum’s Working Group on Market and Institutional 
Risk, published a preliminary report in October 2007, followed by an intermediary 
report in February 2008 and a final report in April 2008 with recommendations for 
how to improve the resilience of the global financial system. While various reports 
differ  with  respect  to  language  used  to  describe  the  behaviour  of  the  financial 
markets in 2007-2008, all basically agree on the key elements of the turmoil. 
Figure 1 reflects the view expressed by Bank of England (2007). The turmoil was 
triggered  by  an  increased  default  rate  in  the  US  subprime  mortgage  market.  In 
response to this increase in default rates, investors became more risk averse and as a 
result  lost  interest  in  financial  instruments  with  an  assumed  exposure  to  the 
subprime markets,  in particular  investors,  became weary of the structured finance 
markets,  i.e.,  those  markets  focused on trading  structured finance  products.  Such 
products  are  designed  to  enable  funding  on  the  basis  of  assets  rather  than  the 
perceived risk of the entity seeking funds. A key process used to achieve this goal is 
securitization,  i.e.,  the  process  of  packaging  assets  into  a  new type  of  financial 
instrument (cf., Gallati, 2003, p. 246).
Fig. 1. Crisis “Phases” of the 2007 Financial Markets Turmoil (Based on Bank of 
England’s 2007 Financial Stability Report’s Chart 1)
Investor weariness spilled over to the short-term global credit markets and as a result 
major  Financial  Services  firms  faced increased  liquidity  risk.  Due to the need to 
provide  cover  for  funds  typically  available  to  investors  on  the  short-term credit 
markets,  global  financial  firms experienced a major  deterioration  of  their balance 
sheets. The result was a perceived need to “hoard” cash and an increased aversion to 
risk. This triggered tensions on the inter banking lending market resulting in reduced 
2) The first Financial Stability reports were published in 1996 - 1997 by the Bank of England, 
the Norwegian central bank Norges Bank and the Swedish central bank Riksbanken. Since then 
more than 50 central banks publish Financial Stability reports. 
liquidity and higher inter banking interest rates (i.e., LIBOR). In parallel, complex 
asset  classes  experienced  continued  devaluation  leading  to an increased  need for 
capital. As a result, some firms have continued to shed assets, e.g., Merrill Lynch, a 
USA based Financial  Services Company, sold 30 billion dollars worth of asset in 
July-August 2008.
Central Banks such as Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
US Federal  Reserve  Bank reacted to the turmoil  by cutting  interest  rates  and by 
pouring money into the global financial  system, albeit using different methods.  In 
the beginning,  these  activities  were  not  coordinated,  but  over  time,  as  the global 
impact  was  recognized,  key  activities  such  as  improving  liquidity  became 
coordinated.  In  fact,  the  recommendations  published  by  the  Financial  Stability 
Forum in April  2008 demonstrate  a great  degree of intent  to coordinate  activities 
including  leveraging  the  Basel  II  accord  (BIS,  2008),  the  previously  mentioned 
capital framework developed by the Bank for International Settlement. 
In the April 2008, the Financial Stability Forum provided a summary of how various 
risk management processes “broke down” (Financial Stability Forum, 2008, p. 16):
1. Regulators  and supervisory  bodies failed to identify the risks associated with 
Financial  Services firms’ structured financial  products and other types of off-
balance sheet entities. As a result firms ended up not having sufficient capital 
buffers to deal with asset devaluations and decreased investor risk appetite. 
2. Financial  firms  misjudged  the  risk  associated  with  off-balance  sheet  entities 
often due to an over-reliance on risk ratings provided by credit rating agencies 
(CRAs).3). In other words, instead of performing their own analysis, firms relied 
on ratings provided by specific companies such as Standard & Poor’s. 
3. Commonly used metrics to assess market risk, i.e., “…the risk of losses in on- 
and  off-balance  sheet  positions  arising  from  movements  in  market  prices” 
(Gallati,  2003,  p.  34),  such  as  Value  at  Risk (VaR)  could  not  be  leveraged. 
Primary  reasons  for  why VaR could  not  be  used  include  that  VaR requires 
historical data and the ability to “mark-to-Market”. The latter, i.e., the need to 
assign an asset a value based on the current market price of the same or similar 
type  of  asset,  could  not  be  done  in  because  there  were  no  markets  for  the 
particular asset type! The reason for this was that investors’ risk averseness had 
caused markets to quickly “dry up.” As a result, valuations were model-based 
and of course likely not to reflect a realistic market value. 
4. Investors (i.e., market participants) misjudged at least one of the following: a) 
Borrowers risk of defaulting, b) The dangers associated with making too many 
investments in a single type of assets, or, financial instrument, and c) The risks 
associated  with  reduced  liquidity,  i.e.,  the  ability  to  turn  an  asset  into  cash 
without any impact on the value. 
3) A credit rating agency is a company that assigns risk ratings to financial instruments. An 
example of a credit rating agency in the USA is Standard & Poor's.
3 KEY RESILIENCE ENGINEERING CONCEPTS
The  first  key  premise  in  Resilience  Engineering  is  that  adverse  outcomes  are 
associated with an organization’s lack of ability to anticipate significant changes in 
its  risk  exposure.  Lacking  this  ability  is  most  likely  also  associated  with  an 
organization’s  inability  to pro-actively establish risk mitigants,  i.e.,  processes that 
help  to reduce  impact  of  adverse  events.   As adverse  events  actually  eventually 
occur,  the organization’s  attempts to manage impact of these events are therefore 
likely to be opportunistic, or may even be scrambled (cf., Sundström & Hollnagel, 
2006).  Over time such an organization  has  a high probability  to transition into a 
“catastrophic state”, i.e., an irreversible state of failure.
The second key premise of a Resilience Engineering perspective is that focus moves 
away  from  system  stability to  system  sustainability.  As  a  result,  performance 
variability  is  needed  to  evolve  with  an  ever  changing  environment.  Indeed,  if 
stability  is defined as a lack of variability,  the system will not  be resilient  and is 
therefore  almost  guaranteed  to fail!  In the present  work,  we look at performance 
variability  as changes in behaviour associated with a constant  need to maintain a 
balance between “Healthy” and “Unhealthy” states, and a particular entity’s ability 
to make  these  transitions  is  seen as  an indicator  of  resilience  (cf.,  Sundström & 
Hollnagel, 2006). When sustained performance is the key focus instead of stability, 
a primary capability of any system is to develop and maintain the ability to change 
over time. The need to change might be triggered by a need to adjust to internal and/
or external process changes.  
An organization’s risk exposure can increase due to internal and/or external process 
changes.   The  reason  being  that  such  process  changes  might  result  in  outcomes 
associated with higher risk exposure for a part of, or, the whole system. To illustrate 
this point, we will consider how internal and an external process changes can bring 
about risk exposure changes for a Financial Services organization:
(1)  Internal  Process  Change: Financial  Services  firm  A  decides  to  change  its 
underwriting procedure to provide loans to borrowers that already have borrowed an 
amount  that exceeds their annual income by 100%. This change will increase the 
firms risk exposure by making it more likely that its borrowers will default on their 
loans;  thus eventually leading to higher losses.  From a functional  perspective, the 
underwriting  process  is  part  of  the  Financial  Services  function  to  “Transfer 
Economic  Resources”.  Merton  & Brodie  (1995,  p.  14)  defined  this  function  as 
function  focused  on  transferring  economic  resources  across  industries  and 
geographical regions. 
(2)  External Process Change: A credit rating agency changes the risk assessment 
methodology used to assign risk ratings to financial instruments. (The change in a 
rating  agency’s  risk  assessment  process  is  also  associated  with  the  function  to 
“Transfer  Economic  Resources”.)  This  new  risk  assessment  methodology 
systematically  underestimates the risk associated with a specific  type of financial 
instrument.  Financial  Services B does not have an ability to perform risk analysis 
and as a result simply accepts the credit agency’s rating. The result is that the firm 
remains  unaware  of  the  increased  risk  exposure  as  it  decides  to  invest  in  the 
instrument. Financial Services firm C has the ability to perform their own analysis 
and decides to invest in the financial instrument with an awareness of the increased 
risk  exposure.  Unlike  Financial  Services  firm  B,  firm  C  decides  to  dedicate 
resources to monitor the risk associated with the financial asset. As a result Financial 
Services firm C is in the position to be proactive relative to any market valuation 
changes, whereas firm B will be reactive. Figure 2 shows the situation for Financial 
Services firm B, while Figure 3 shows the situation for Financial  Services firm C. 
Both figures  use the  Functional  Resonance  Analysis  Method (FRAM; Hollnagel, 
2004) to illustrate  the two firms’  exposure  to unexpected variability.  In a FRAM 
model,  the  risk  for  unexpected  variability  is  represented  by  illustrating  how 
functions  may  be  coupled  to  each  other.  Such  functional  coupling  provides  a 
mechanism for understanding how unexpected variability may propagate through a 
system.  Functional  representations  such  as  those  in  Figures  2  and  3  should  be 
contrasted with the traditional flow-chart description of events as used in Figure 1.
A FRAM representation describes each of the essential functions of a system using 
six  parameters  (Figures  2  and  3 only  show some  of  the  functions  hence  do not 
represent a complete analysis). The six parameters are: 
• Input (I): that which the function processes or transforms, or that which starts 
the  function.  In  Financial  Services,  this  could  be  the  information  that  is 
modified, interpreted, or used in any other way by the function.
Fig. 2. Impact of external changes on Firm B’s ability to sustain performance
• Output (O): that which is the result of the function, either an entity or a state 
change. In Financial  Services, this can be economic resources for a party that 
previously  did  not  have  any  economic  resources.  For  example,  Mr.  Smith 
decides to go to a bank to apply for a mortgage and the bank does decide to 
transfer financial resources to Mr. Smith, i.e., provide Mr. Smith with a loan of 
some type. 
• Preconditions  (P):  conditions  that  must  be  exist  before  a  function  can  be 
executed.  An  example  in  Financial  Services  is  the  existence  of  a  financial 
market with a defined demand and supply.
• Resources  (R):  that  which  the  function  needs,  or  consumes,  to  produce  the 
output. This could be some type of financial  assets and/or market participants 
such as investors.
• Time (T):  temporal  constraints  affecting  the function (with regard to starting 
time, finishing time, or duration).  For example,  the time of a transaction can 
greatly influence the value of an output in the Financial Services industry. 
• Control (C): how the function is monitored or controlled. In Financial Services 
this can be a firm’s risk management function and/or a regulatory function such 
as a Central Bank.
Fig. 3. Impact of external changes on Firm C’s ability to sustain performance
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate one source of unexpected variability (indicated by shaded 
output) due to process changes, i.e., variability of a credit agency’s rating due to a 
change in rating methodology. Any such change will have an impact on ratings (or 
perceptions  of  ratings)  and  will  produce  unexpected  variability  in any  firms  risk 
management function.  As investors loose trust in credit ratings of certain financial 
instruments,  any  transfer  of  economic  resources  relying  on  these  financial 
instruments will produce a negative outcome, i.e., no transfer of economic resources. 
One of the key drivers of investors’  loss of trust could be ever increasing default 
rates due to poor underwriting procedures by yet other participants in the Financial 
Services system. A key variability of the 2007-2008 Financial Markets was indeed 
related to a loss of credibility of credit ratings,  overtime investors grew more and 
more risk aversive as default rates of certain types of mortgages continued to rise. 
The  result  was  unexpected  behaviour  of  the  “Transfer  of  Economic  Resources” 
function  which  lead  to  the  rapid  demise  of  some  companies.  One  of  these  was 
Northern Rock, a UK based mortgage lender. 
4 EXAMPLE: NORTHERN ROCK
Northern  Rock  was  listed  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange  in  1997  and  was 
considered to be a very successful Financial  Services firm. All of this changed as 
Northern Rock had to ask Bank of England for a line of credit on September 14, 
2007 to overcome a “liquidity  crunch”.  As a result  Northern Rock experienced a 
classical bank run as customers were lining up to withdraw their savings. Northern 
Rock was nationalized in February  2008 and as a result is no longer traded as a 
public company. Figure 4 illustrates Northern Rock’s business model.
Fig. 4. Northern Rock’s Business Model
Basically, Northern Rock transferred economic resources to retail customers.  Two 
sources  of funding were used to transfer  economic  resources:  Bank deposits,  i.e., 
funds from banking customers’ deposits. This source of funding was used to fulfil 
about 25% of customers’ requests for mortgages. The other 75% were fulfilled by 
getting funds from the global credit markets. As we all know these markets started 
to experience major distress in the summer of 2007. The simplified representation in 
Figure  5  illustrates  the  risk  that  Northern  Rock  was  taking  due  to  its  business 
strategy  to  leverage  funding  from  global  credit  markets  to  fulfil  75%  of  the 
mortgages.  Grey  functions  indicate  that  a  function  operates  outside  of  Northern 
Rock’s control.
Fig.5. Functional view of Northern Rock’s risk exposure
Note,  that  75% of funding  resources  for Northern Rock’s  “Transfer of  Economic 
Resources”  function  requires  consistent  (positive)  output  from the  Global  Credit 
Markets’  “Transfer  of  Economic  Resources”  function.  However,  the  key  pre-
condition for this function to operate successfully is Investors’  risk assessment  of 
Northern  Rock’s  financial  instruments.  As financial  markets  became  increasingly 
distressed  in  2007,  investors’  trust  in  mortgage  backed  financial  instruments 
severely deteriorated, and as a result Northern Rock experienced an acute liquidity 
crisis due to its high dependence on mortgaged backed securitization as a method of 
creating  funds.  A  resilience  engineering  perspective  combined  with  a  simple 
analysis using a functional  model to identify key dependencies could clearly have 
identified the risk to Northern Rock. 
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